In the Horn theory based approach for cryptographic protocol analysis, cryptographic protocols and (Dolev-Yao) intruders are modeled by Horn theories and security analysis boils down to solving the derivation problem for Horn theories. This approach and the tools based on this approach, including ProVerif, have been very successful in the automatic analysis of cryptographic protocols w.r.t. an unbounded number of sessions. However, dealing with the algebraic properties of operators such as the exclusive OR (XOR) has been problematic. In particular, ProVerif cannot deal with XOR.
INTRODUCTION
In the Horn theory based approach for cryptographic protocol analysis, cryptographic protocols and the so-called Dolev-Yao intruder are modeled by Horn theories. The security analysis, including the analysis of secrecy and authentication properties, then essentially boils down to solving the derivation problem for Horn theories, i.e., the question whether a certain fact is derivable from the Horn theory. This kind of analysis takes into account that an unbounded number of protocol sessions may run concurrently. While the derivation problem is undecidable in general, there are very successful automatic analysis tools, with ProVerif [2] being one of the most promintent ones among them, which work well in practice.
However, dealing with the algebraic properties of operators, such as the exclusive OR (XOR), which are frequently used in cryptographic protocols, has been problematic in the Horn theory approach. While ProVerif has been extended to deal with certain algebraic properties in [4] , associative operators, which in particular include XOR, are still out of the scope. Even though there exist some decidability results for the derivation problem in certain classes of Horn theories with XOR [9, 20, 14] , the decision procedures have not led to practical implementations yet, except for the very specific setting in [14] (see the related work).
The goal of this work is therefore to come up with a practical approach that allows for the automatic analysis of a wide range of cryptographic protocols with XOR, in a setting with an unbounded number of protocol sessions. Our approach is to reduce this problem to the one without XOR, i.e., to the simpler case without algebraic properties. This simpler problem can then be solved by tools, such as ProVerif, that a priori cannot deal with XOR, but are very efficient in solving the XOR-free case. More precisely, the contribution of this paper is as follows.
Contribution of this paper. We consider an expressive class of (unary) Horn theories, called ⊕-linear (see Section 3). A Horn theory is ⊕-linear, if for every Horn clause in this theory, except for the clause that models the intruder's ability to apply the XOR operator (I(x), I(y) → I(x ⊕ y)), the terms that occur in these clauses are ⊕-linear. A term is ⊕-linear if for every subterm of the form t ⊕ t in this term, it is true that t or t does not contain variables. We do not put any other restriction on the Horn theories. In particu-lar, our approach will allow us to deal with all cryptographic protocols and intruder capabilities that can be modeled as ⊕-linear Horn theories.
We show that the derivation problem for ⊕-linear Horn theories with XOR can be reduced to a purely syntactic derivation problem, i.e., a derivation problem where the algebraic properties of XOR do not have to be considered anymore (see Section 3, 4, and 5) . Now, the syntactic derivation problem can be solved by highly efficient tools, such as ProVerif, which cannot deal with XOR. We believe that the techniques developed in this paper are interesting beyond the case of XOR. For example, using these techniques it might be possible to also deal with other operators, such as Diffie-Hellman-Exponentiation.
Using ProVerif, we apply our two step approach-first reduce the problem, then run ProVerif on the result of the reduction-to the analysis of several cryptographic protocols that use the XOR operator in an essential way (see Section 6) . The experimental results demonstrate that our approach is practical. In one case, we found a new attack on a protocol.
We note that a potential alternative to our approach is to perform unification modulo XOR instead of syntactic unification in a resolution algorithm such as the one employed by ProVerif. Whether or not this approach is practical is an open problem. The main difficulty is that unification modulo XOR is much more inefficient than syntactic unification; it is NP-complete rather than linear and, in general, there does not exist a (single) most general unifier.
We point the reader to [17] for a full version of this paper and to [16] for our implementation.
Related work. In [9, 20] , classes of Horn theories (security protocols) are identified for which the derivation problem modulo XOR is shown to be decidable. These classes are orthogonal to the one studied in this paper. While ⊕-linearity is not required, other restrictions are put on the Horn clauses, in particular linearity on the occurrence of variables. The classes in [9, 20] do, for example, not contain the Recursive Authentication and the SK3 protocol, which, however, we can model (see Section 6) . To the best of our knowledge, the decision procedures proposed in [9, 20] have not been implemented. The procedure proposed in [9] has non-elementary runtime.
In [19, 14, 13] , the IBM 4758 CCA API, which we also consider in our experiments, has been analyzed. Notably, in [14] a decision procedure, along with an implementation, is presented for the automatic analysis of a class of security protocols which contains the IBM 4758 CCA API. However, the protocol class and the decision procedure is especially tailored to the IBM 4758 CCA API. The only primitives that can be handled are the XOR operator and symmetric encryption. All other primitives, such as pairing, public-key encryption, and hashing, are out of the scope of the method in [14] . The specification of the IBM 4758 CCA API in [14] is hard coded in a C implementation.
In [4] , it is described how the basic resolution algorithm used in ProVerif can be extended to handle some equational theories. However, as already mentioned in that work, associative operators, such as XOR, are out of the scope of this extension.
In [12] , the so-called finite variant property has been studied for XOR and other operators. It has been used (implicitly or explicitly) in other works [10, 9] , and also plays a role in our work (see Section 4) .
In [7, 10, 15] , decision procedures for protocol analysis with XOR w.r.t. a bounded (rather than an unbounded) number of sessions are presented. The notion of ⊕-linearity that we use is taken from the work in [15] . That work also contains some reduction argument. However, our work is different to [15] in several respects: First, of course, our approach is for an unbounded number of sessions, but it is not guaranteed to terminate. Second, the class of protocols (and intruder capabilities) we can model in our setting is much more general than the one in [15] . Third, the reduction presented in [15] heavily depends on the bounded session assumption; the argument would not work in our setting. Fourth, the reduction presented in [15] is not practical.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce Horn theories modulo the XOR operator and illustrate how these theories are used to model the so-called Dolev-Yao intruder and cryptographic protocols by a running example.
Horn theories. Let Σ be a finite signature and V be a set of variables. The set of terms over Σ and V is defined as usual. By var(t) we denote the set of variables that occur in the term t. We assume Σ to contain the binary function symbol ⊕ (exclusive OR), as well as a constant 0. To model cryptographic protocols, Σ typically also contains constants (atomic messages), such as principal names, nonces, and keys, the unary function symbol hash(·) (hashing), the unary function symbol pub(·) (public key), and binary function symbols such as ·, · (pairing), {·} · (symmetric encryption), and {|·| } · (public key encryption). The signature Σ may also contain any other free function symbol, such as various kinds of signatures and MACs. We only require that the corresponding intruder rules are ⊕-linear (see Section 3), which rules that do not contain the symbol ⊕ always are.
Ground terms, i.e. terms without variables, are called messages. For a unary predicate q and a (ground) term t we call q(t) a (ground) atom. A substitution is a finite set of pairs of the form σ = {t1/x1, . . . , tn/xn}, where t1, . . . , tn are terms and x1, . . . , xn are variables. The set dom(σ) = {x1, . . . , xn} is called the domain of σ. We define σ(x) = x if x / ∈ dom(σ). The application tσ of σ to a term/atom/set of terms t is defined as usual.
We call a term standard if its top-symbol is not ⊕; otherwise, it is called non-standard. For example, the term a, b ⊕ a is standard, while b ⊕ a is non-standard. A non-standard subterm s of t is called complete, if either s = t or s occurs in t as a direct subterm of some standard term. For instance, for t = a ⊕ {(x ⊕ y) ⊕ z} y , b , the terms a⊕{(x ⊕ y) ⊕ z} y and (x⊕y)⊕z are complete non-standard subterms of t, but x ⊕ y is not.
To model the algebraic properties of the exclusive OR (XOR), we consider the congruence relation ∼ on terms induced by the following equational theory (see, e.g., [10, 7] ):
For example, we have that tex = a⊕b⊕{0} k ⊕b⊕{c ⊕ c} k ∼ a. (Due to the associativity of ⊕ we often omit brackets and simply write a ⊕ b ⊕ c instead of
For atoms q(t) and q (t ), we write q(t) ∼ q (t ) if q = q and t ∼ t . We say that two terms are equivalent modulo AC, where AC stands for associativity and commutativity, if they are equivalent modulo (1) . A term is ⊕-reduced if modulo AC, the identities (2), when interpreted as reductions from left to right, cannot be applied. Clearly, every term can be turned into ⊕-reduced form and this form is uniquely determined modulo AC. For example, a is the ⊕-reduced form of tex.
A Horn theory T is a finite set of Horn clauses of the form a1, . . . , an → a0, where ai is an atom for every i ∈ {0, . . . , n}. We assume that the variables that occur on the right-hand side of a Horn clause also occur on the left-hand side. If n = 0, i.e., the left-hand side of the clause is always true, we call the Horn clause a0 a fact.
Given a Horn theory T and a ground atom a, we say that a can syntactically be derived from A w.r.t. T (written T a) if there exists a derivation for a from T , i.e., there exists a sequence π = b1, . . . , b l of ground atoms such that b l = a and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , l} there exists a substitution σ and a Horn clause a1, . . . , an → a0 in T such that a0σ = bi and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n} there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1} with ajσ = b k . In what follows, we sometimes refer to bi by π(i) and to b1, . . . , bi by π ≤i . The length l of a derivation π is referred to by |π|.
We call a sequence b1, . . . , b l of ground atoms an incomplete syntactic derivation of a from T if b l = a and T ∪ {b1, . . . , bi−1} bi for every i ∈ {1, . . . , b l }.
Similarly, we write T ⊕ a if there exists a derivation of a from T modulo XOR, i.e., there exists a sequence b1, . . . , b l of ground atoms such that b l ∼ a and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , l} there exists a substitution σ and a Horn clause a1, . . . , an → a0 in T such that a0σ ∼ bi and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n} there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1} with ajσ ∼ b k . Incomplete derivations modulo XOR are defined analogously to the syntactic case.
Given T and a, we call the problem of deciding whether T a (T ⊕ a) is true, the deduction problem (modulo XOR). In case T models a protocol and the intruder (as described below), the fact that T ⊕ a, with a = I(t), is not true means that the term t is secret, i.e., the intruder cannot get hold of t even when running an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol and using algebraic properties of the XOR operator.
Modeling Protocols by Horn theories. Following [2] , we now illustrate how Horn theories can be used to analyze cryptographic protocols, where, however, we take the XOR operator into account. While here we concentrate on secrecy properties, authentication is discussed in Section 5. As mentioned in the introduction, the Horn theory approach allows us to analyze the security of protocols w.r.t. an unbounded number of sessions and with no bound on the message size in a fully automatic and sound way. However, the algorithms are not guaranteed to terminate and may produce false attacks.
A Horn theory for modeling protocols and the (DolevYao) intruder uses only the predicate I. The fact I(t) means that the intruder may be able to obtain the term t. The fundamental property is that if I(t) cannot be derived from the set of clauses, then the protocol preserves the secrecy of t. The Horn theory consists of three sets of Horn clauses: the initial intruder facts, the intruder rules, and the protocol rules. The set of initial intruder facts represents the initial
I(x), I(y) → I(x ⊕ y) Figure 1 : Intruder Rules.
intruder knowledge, such as names of principals and public keys. The clauses in this set are facts, e.g., I(a) (the intruder knows the name a) and I(pub(ska)) (the intruder knows the public key of a, with ska being the corresponding private key). The set of intruder rules represents the intruders ability to derive new messages. For the cryptographic primitives mentioned above, the set of intruder rules consists of the clauses depicted in Figure 1 . The last clause in this figure will be called the ⊕-rule. It allows the intruder to perform the XOR operation on arbitrary messages. The set of protocol rules represents the actions performed in the actual protocol. The ith protocol step of a principal is described by a clause of the form I(r1), . . . , I(ri) → I(si) where the terms rj, j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, describe the (patterns of) messages the principal has received in the previous i−1st steps plus the (pattern of the) message in the ith step. The term I(si) is the (pattern of) the ith output message of the principal. Given a protocol P , we denote by TP the Horn theory that comprises all three sets mentioned above. Let us illustrate the above by a simple example protocol, which we will use as a running example throughout this paper. Applications of our approach to more complex protocols are presented in Section 6.2. We emphasize that the kind of Horn theories outlined above are only an example of how protocols and intruders can be modeled. As already mentioned in the introduction, our methods applies to all ⊕-linear Horn theories.
Running example. We consider a protocol that was proposed in [7] . It is a variant of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol in which XOR is employed. The informal description of the protocol, which we denote by PNSL ⊕ , is as follows:
where N and M are nonces generated by A and B, respectively. As noted in [7] , this protocol is insecure; a similar attack as the one on the original Needham-Schroeder protocol can be mounted, where, however, now the algebraic properties of XOR are exploited.
To illustrate how this protocol can be modeled in terms of Horn theories, let P be a set of participant names and H ⊆ P be the set of names of the honest participants. As proved in [11] , for the secrecy property it suffices to consider the case P = {a, b} and H = {a} (for authentication three participants are needed). In the following, ska, for a ∈ P, denotes the private key of a, n(a, b) denotes the nonce sent by a ∈ P to b ∈ P in message 1., and m(b, a) denotes the nonce generated by b and sent to a in message 2.
The initial intruder knowledge is the set {I(a) | a ∈ P} ∪ {I(pub(ska)) | a ∈ P} ∪ {I(ska) | a ∈ P \ H} of facts. The intruder rules are those depicted in Figure 1 . The first step of the protocol performed by an honest principal is modeled by the facts:
for a ∈ H, b ∈ P. Note that it is not necessary to model messages sent by dishonest principals, since these are taken care of by the actions that can be performed by the intruder.
The second step of the protocol performed by an honest principal is modeled by the clauses: (3) for b ∈ H, a ∈ P. The third step of the protocol performed by an honest principal is modeled by the clauses:
for a ∈ H, b ∈ P. The set of Horn clauses defined above is denoted by TP NSL ⊕ . It is not hard to verify that we have
In fact, secrecy of the nonces sent by an honest responder to an honest initiator is not guaranteed by the protocol [7] .
DOMINATED DERIVATIONS
In Section 4, we show how to reduce the deduction problem modulo XOR to the one without XOR for ⊕-linear Horn theories, introduced below. This reduction allows us to reduce the problem of checking secrecy for protocols that use XOR to the case of protocols that do not use XOR. (The authentication problem will be considered in Section 5.) The latter problem can then be solved by tools that cannot deal with XOR, such as ProVerif. The class of protocol and intruder capabilities that we can handle this way is quite large: It contains all protocol and intruder rules that are ⊕-linear.
In this section, we prove a proposition that will be the key to the reduction. Before we can state the proposition, we need to introduce ⊕-linear Horn theories and some further terminology.
A term is ⊕-linear if for each of its subterms of the form t ⊕ s, where t and s may be standard or non-standard terms, it is true that t or s is ground. In other words, if a term t contains a subterm of the form t1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ tn with n ≥ 2, ti standard for every i, and there exists i and j, i = j, such that ti and tj are not ground, then t is not ⊕-linear. For example, for variables x, y, z and a constant a, the term t 1 ex = a, a ⊕ x, y is ⊕-linear, but the term t 2 ex = a, a ⊕ x, y ⊕ z is not. A Horn clause is called ⊕-linear if each term occurring in the clause is ⊕-linear. A Horn theory is ⊕-linear if each clause in this theory, except for the ⊕-rule (see Fig. 1 ), is ⊕-linear. In particular, given a protocol P , the induced theory TP is ⊕-linear if the sets of protocol and intruder rules, except for the ⊕-rule, are.
Our running example is an example of a protocol with an ⊕-linear Horn theory (note that, in (3) and (4), b is a constant); other examples are mentioned in Section 6.2. Also, many intruder rules are ⊕-linear. In particular, all those that do not contain the XOR symbol. For example, in addition to the cryptographic primitives mentioned in Figure 1 , other primitives, such as various kinds of signatures, encryption with prefix properties, and MACs have ⊕-linear intruder rules.
Besides ⊕-linearity, we also need a more fine-grained notion: C-domination. Let C be a finite set of standard ⊕-reduced ground terms such that C does not contain two elements m, m with m = m and m ∼ m . (For the efficiency of our reduction (Section 4), it is important to keep C as small as possible.) Let C ⊕ = {t | there exist c1, . . . , cn ∈ C such that t ∼ c1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ cn} be the ⊕-closure of C. Note that 0 ∈ C ⊕ . Finally, letC = {t | t ∼ t ∈ C, t standard}. Now, a term is C-dominated if, for each of its subterms of the form t ⊕ s, where t and s may be standard or nonstandard, it is true that t or s is in C ⊕ . For example, the term t 1 ex from above is {a}-dominated, but is is not {b}-dominated. The term t 2 ex is not {a}-dominated. A Horn clause is C-dominated, if the terms occurring in this clause are C-dominated; similarly for derivations. Finally, a Horn theory T is C-dominated if each clause in T , except for the ⊕-rule, is C-dominated. For example, we have that the Horn theory TP NSL ⊕ of our running example is {a, b}-dominated.
(Recall that P = {a, b}.)
C-dominated terms can also be characterized in terms of what we call bad terms. We call a non-standard term t bad (w.r.t. C), if t ∼ c ⊕ t1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ tn for c ∈ C ⊕ , pairwise ⊕-distinct standard terms t1, . . . , tn / ∈C, and n > 1, where t and t are ⊕-distinct if t ∼ t . A non-standard term which is not bad is called good. The following lemma is easy to see:
There is an obvious connection between ⊕-linearity and Cdomination:
Lemma 2. For every ⊕-linear term/Horn theory/derivation there exists a finite set C of standard ⊕-reduced messages such that the term/Horn theory/derivation is C-dominated.
The set C mentioned in the lemma could be chosen to be the set of all ground standard terms occurring in the term/Horn theory/derivation. However, C should be chosen as small as possible in order to make the reduction presented in Section 4 more efficient.
As mentioned, the following proposition is the key to our reduction. The proposition states that C-dominated Horn theories always allow for C-dominated derivations. Because of Lemma 2, the proposition applies to all ⊕-linear Horn theories. Proposition 1. Let T be a C-dominated Horn theory and b be a C-dominated fact. If T ⊕ b, then there exists a C-dominated derivation modulo XOR for b from T .
Before we present the proof of this proposition, we introduce some terminology, which is also used in subsequent sections, and sketch the idea of the proof. We write t C t if t ∼ c⊕t (or equivalently, c ⊕ t ∼ t), for some c ∈ C ⊕ . For the rest of this section we fix a derivation π modulo XOR for b from T . W.l.o.g. we may assume that each term occurring in π is in ⊕-reduced form and that each term in a substitution applied in π is in ⊕-reduced form as well.
The key definitions for the proof of Proposition 1 are the following ones: Definition 1. For a standard term t, the set C, and the derivation π, we define the type of t (w.r.t. π and C), writteñ t, to be an ⊕-reduced element c of C ⊕ such that π(i) ∼ I(c ⊕ t) for some i, and for each j < i, it is not true that
If such an i does not exist, we say that the type of t is undefined.
Note that the type of a term is uniquely determined modulo AC and that equivalent terms (w.r.t. ∼) have equivalent types.
In the following definition, we define an operator which replaces standard terms in bad terms which are not inC by their types. This turns a bad term into a good one. To define the operator, we use the following notation. We write ϕ⊕[x1, . . . , xn] for a term which is built only from ⊕, elements ofC, and the pairwise distinct variables x1, . . . , xn such that each xi occurs exactly once in ϕ⊕[x1, . . We will see (Lemma 10) that if t occurs in π, then the types of ti in the above definition are always defined. Note also that ∆ is defined with respect to the given π and C. Now, the main idea behind the proof of Proposition 1 is to apply ∆(·) to π. We then show that (i) ∆(π) is an incomplete C-dominated derivation modulo XOR for b from T and (ii) to obtain a complete derivation only C-dominated terms are needed. The details of the proof are presented next, by a series of lemmas, some of which are also used in Section 4.
Proof of Proposition 1. The following lemma is easy to show by structural induction on s:
Lemma 3. Let s and t be messages such that s is ⊕-reduced, s contains a complete bad subterm s , and s ∼ t. Then, there exists a complete bad subterm t of t such that t ∼ s .
The following lemma says that when substituting variables in a C-dominated term, then complete bad terms that might have been introduced by the substitution cannot be canceled out by the C-dominated term.
Lemma 4. Let rθ ∼ t, for a term t, an ⊕-reduced substitution θ, and a C-dominated term r. Then, for each complete bad subterm r of rθ there exists a complete (bad) subterm t of t such that t ∼ r .
We now can show that if an instance of a C-dominated term contains a complete bad subterm, then this term (up to C ) must be part of the substitution with which the instance was obtained.
Lemma 5. Let θ be a ground substitution and s be a Cdominated term. Assume that t is a complete bad subterm of sθ. Then, there exists a variable x and a complete bad subterm t of θ(x) such that t C t.
The converse of Lemma 5 is also easy to show by structural induction on s.
Lemma 6. Let θ be a ground substitution and s be a Cdominated term. If sθ is C-dominated, then so is θ(x) for every x ∈ var(s).
Similarly to Lemma 5, we can prove the following lemma. The main observation is that ∆(c⊕t) ∼ c⊕∆(t), for c ∈ C ⊕ .
Lemma 7. ∆(sθ) ∼ s(∆θ), for a C-dominated term s and a substitution θ.
Another basic and simple to prove property of ∆ is captured in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Let s and t be terms such that s ∼ t. Then, ∆(s) ∼ ∆(t).
The following lemma says that if an instance of a Cdominated Horn clause contains a complete bad subterm on its right-hand side, then this term (up to C ) already occurs on the left-hand side.
Lemma 9. Assume that p1(r1), . . . , pn(rn) → p0(s) is a C-dominated Horn clause, θ is an ⊕-reduced ground substitution, w, u1, . . . , un are ⊕-reduced messages such that w ∼ sθ and ui ∼ riθ, for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
If w is a complete bad subterm of w, then there exists a complete bad subterm u of ui, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, such that u C w .
Proof. Suppose that w is a complete bad subterm of w. Because w ∼ sθ and w is ⊕-reduced, by Lemma 3, there exists a complete bad subterm t of sθ with w ∼ t. By Lemma 5, there exists a variable x ∈ var(s) and a complete bad subterm t of θ(x) with t C t. Because x, as a variable of s, has to occur also in ri for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the term t is a (not necessarily complete) subterm of riθ. Since ri is C-dominated, there exists a complete subterm r of riθ with r C t . Now, recall that t C t and t ∼ w . It follows that r C w . Furthermore, since w is bad, so is r . Now, by Lemma 4, there exists a complete bad subterm u of ui such that u C r C w .
The following lemma connects bad terms that occur in a derivation with the types of their subterms.
⊕ and pairwise ⊕-distinct standard terms t1, . . . , tn / ∈C, then, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists
Proof. If n = 1, then I(t1 ⊕ t1) belongs to π ≤i , by the definition of types. Now, suppose that n > 1. In that case we will show, by induction on i, something more than what is claimed in the lemma: If t with t ∼ c ⊕ t1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ tn, c ∈ C ⊕ , and pairwise ⊕-distinct standard terms ti / ∈C, occurs as a complete bad subterm in π(i), then, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists j ≤ i such that π(j) ∼ I(t k ⊕ t k ).
Suppose that t, as above, occurs as a complete bad subterm in π(i).
If there exists t such that t C t and t occurs in π<i as a complete subterm, then we are trivially done by the induction hypothesis. (Note that t is bad since t is.) So, suppose that such a t does not occur in π<i as a complete subterm. By Lemma 9, π(i) cannot be obtained by a Cdominated Horn clause. Thus, π(i) is obtained by the ⊕-rule, which means that π(i) = I(u) with u ∼ s ⊕ r for some I(s) and I(r) occurring in π<i. We may assume that s ∼ d ⊕ s1 ⊕· · ·⊕sp, with d ∈ C ⊕ , and pairwise ⊕-distinct ⊕-reduced standard terms s1, . . . , sp / ∈C, and r ∼ e ⊕ r1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ rq, with e ∈ C ⊕ , and pairwise ⊕-distinct ⊕-reduced standard terms r1, . . . , rq / ∈C. According to our assumption, neither s nor r contains a complete subterm t with t C t. In particular, neither s nor r contains t with t ∼ t. So, since π(i) ∼ I(s ⊕ r) contains t as a complete subterm, it must be the case that t ∼ s ⊕ r. Now, with t ∼ c ⊕ t1 ⊕ . . . ⊕ tn, as above, and k ∈ {1, . . . , n} it follows that either s l ∼ t k or r l ∼ t k , for some l. Suppose that the former case holds (the argument is similar for the latter case). If p > 1 (and thus s is a bad term), then, by the induction hypothesis, we know that there exists j < i such that π(j) ∼ I(s l ⊕ s l ). Since t k ∼ s l , we have that t k ∼s l , and hence, π(j) ∼ I(t k ⊕ t k ). Otherwise, s ∼ d ⊕ t k , and hence, by the definition of types, there exists j < i with π(j) ∼ I(t k ⊕ t k ).
The following lemma is the key in proving that ∆(π) is an incomplete derivation modulo XOR.
Lemma 11. For every i ≤ |π|, if I(c ⊕ t1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ tn), for some c ∈ C ⊕ and pairwise ⊕-distinct standard terms t1, . . . , tn / ∈C, belongs to π<i, then there is a derivation for I(c ⊕t1 ⊕ · · · ⊕tn) from ∆(π<i) modulo XOR.
Proof. If n = 0 or n > 1, then I(c ⊕t1 ⊕ · · · ⊕tn) ∼ I(∆(c ⊕ t1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ tn)) by the definition of ∆, and hence, I(c ⊕t1 ⊕ · · · ⊕tn) can be derived from ∆(π<i). So suppose that n = 1. Since we have I(c ⊕ t1) in π<i, then, by the definition of types, we also have I(t1 ⊕ t1) in π<i. Thus, by the definition of ∆, I(c ⊕ ∆(t1)) and I(t1 ⊕ ∆(t1)) are in ∆(π<i). From these one obtains I(c ⊕t1) by applying the ⊕-rule. Now, we can finish the proof of Proposition 1. First, note that every non-standard message in ∆(π) is C-dominated. This immediately follows from the definition of ∆. We will now show (*): For each i ∈ {1, . . . , |π|}, ∆(π(i)) can be derived from ∆(π<i) modulo XOR by using only C-dominated terms. This then completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Recall that we assume that π is ⊕-reduced and that in this derivation we use only ⊕-reduced substitutions. To prove (*), we consider two cases: Case 1. π(i) is obtained from π<i using a C-dominated Horn clause R = (p1(s1), . . . , pn(sn) → p0(s0)) of T : Then there exists a ⊕-reduced substitution θ such that π(i) ∼ p0(s0θ) and the atoms p1(s1θ), . . . , pn(snθ) occur in π<i modulo XOR. Thus, by Lemma 8, p1(∆(s1θ)), . . . , pn(∆(snθ)) occur in ∆(π<i) modulo XOR. Now, by Lemma 7, we have that ∆(siθ) ∼ si(∆θ), for every i ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Thus, by applying R with the substitution ∆(θ), we obtain ∆(π(i)) ∼ ∆(s0θ) ∼ s0(∆(θ)). Case 2. π(i) is obtained by the ⊕-rule: Hence, there are two atoms I(s) and I(r) in π<i such that π(i) ∼ I(s⊕r). We may assume that s ∼ c ⊕ s1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sm, with c ∈ C ⊕ , and pairwise ⊕-distinct ⊕-reduced standard terms s1, . . . , sm / ∈C, and r ∼ d ⊕ r1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ r l , with d ∈ C ⊕ , and pairwise ⊕-distinct ⊕-reduced standard terms r1, . . . , r l / ∈C. Let {t1, . . . , tn} = (S \ R) ∪ (R \ S), for S = {s1, . . . , sm} and R = {r1, . . . , r l }. Then, π(i) ∼ I(s ⊕ r) ∼ I(c ⊕ d ⊕ t1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ tn). By Lemma 11, we know that I(c ⊕s1 ⊕ · · · ⊕sm) and I(d ⊕r1 ⊕ · · · ⊕r l ) can be derived from ∆(π<i) modulo XOR. Hence, I(t ) with t = c ⊕ d ⊕t1 ⊕ · · · ⊕tn can be derived from ∆(π<i) as well (by applying the ⊕-rule). Now, let us consider two cases: (a) n = 0 or n > 1: In this case, we have that ∆(π(i)) ∼ I(t ), and hence, ∆(π(i)) can be derived from ∆(π<i). (b) n = 1: Because I(c⊕s1 ⊕· · ·⊕sm) and I(d⊕r1 ⊕· · ·⊕r l ) occur in π<i modulo XOR, by Lemma 10, I(t1 ⊕ t1) occurs in π<i modulo XOR as well. Thus, by Lemma 8, I(t1 ⊕ ∆(t1)) occurs in ∆(π<i) modulo XOR. Now, because I(t ), with t = c ⊕ d ⊕t1, can be derived from ∆(π<i) modulo XOR, so can I(c ⊕ d ⊕ ∆(t1)) ∼ ∆(π(i)).
THE REDUCTION
In this section, we show how the deduction problem modulo XOR can be reduced to the deduction problem without XOR for C-dominated theories. More precisely, for a C-dominated theory T , we show how to effectively construct a Horn theory T + such that a (C-dominated) fact can be derived from T modulo XOR iff it can be derived from T + in a syntactic derivation, where XOR is considered to be a function symbol without any algebraic properties. As mentioned, the syntactic deduction problem, and hence, the problem of checking secrecy for cryptographic protocols w.r.t. an unbounded number of sessions, can then be solved by tools, such as ProVerif, which cannot deal with the algebraic properties of XOR.
In the remainder of this section, let T be a C-dominated theory. In what follows, we will first define the reduction function, which turns T into T + , and state the main result (Section 4.1), namely that the reduction is sound and complete as stated above. Before proving this result in Section 4.3, we illustrate the reduction function by our running example (Section 4.2).
The Reduction Function
The reduction function uses an operator · , which turns terms into what we call normal form, and a set Σ(t) of substitutions associated with the term t. We first define this operator and the set Σ(t). The operator · is defined w.r.t. a linear ordering < C on C, which we fix once and for all.
Definition 3. For a C-dominated term t, we define the normal form of t, denoted by t , recursively as follows:
• If t is a variable, then t = t.
• If t = f (t1, . . . , tn) is a standard term, then t = f ( t1 , . . . , tn ).
• If t is non-standard and t ∼ c ⊕ t , for some c ∈ C ⊕ , c ∼ 0, and standard t not inC, then t = c ⊕ t . We say that a term t is in normal form, if t = t . A substitution θ is in normal form, if θ(x) is in normal form for each variable x in the domain of θ.
It is easy to see that t = s for C-dominated terms t and s iff t ∼ s, and that t is ⊕-reduced for any t. By C ⊕ norm , we denote the set { c | c ∈ C ⊕ }. Clearly, this set is finite and computable in exponential time in the size of C.
To define the set Σ(t) of substitutions, we need the notion of fragile subterms. For a C-dominated term t, the set of fragile subterms of t, denoted by F(t), is F(t) = {s | s is a non-ground, standard term which occurs as a subterm of t in the form t ⊕ s or s ⊕ t for some t }. For example,
We are now ready to define the (finite and effectively computable) set Σ(t) of substitutions for a C-dominated term t. The main property of this set is the following: For every C-dominated, ground substitution θ in normal form, there exists a substitution σ ∈ Σ(t) and a substitution θ such that tθ = ( tσ )θ . In other words, the substitutions in Σ(t) yield all relevant instances of t. All ground, normalized instances are syntactic instances of those instances. This resembles the finite variant property of XOR [12] mentioned in the introduction. However, our construction of Σ(t) is tailored and optimized towards C-dominated terms and substitutions. More importantly, we obtain a stronger property in the sense that the equality-tθ = ( tσ )θ -is syntactic equality, not only equality modulo AC; the notion of C-domination, which we introduced here, is crucial in order to obtain this property. Having syntactic equality is important for our reduction in order to get rid of algebraic properties completely.
Definition 4. Let t be a C-dominated term. We define a family of substitutions Σ(t) as follows. The domain of every substitution in Σ(t) is the set of all variables which occur in some s ∈ F(t). Now, σ ∈ Σ, if for each x ∈ dom(σ) one of the following cases holds:
(ii) x ∈ F (t) and σ(x) = c ⊕ x, for some c ∈ C ⊕ norm , c = 0, (iii) there exists s ∈ F(t) with x ∈ var(s) and a Cdominated substitution θ in normal form such that sθ ∈ C ⊕ and σ(x) = θ(x).
To illustrate the definition and the property mentioned above, consider, as an example, t = c ⊕ x and the substitution θ(x) = d ⊕ m, with d ∈ C ⊕ norm and a C-dominated, standard term m / ∈ C ⊕ norm in normal form. In this case, we can choose σ(x) = d ⊕ x according to (ii). With θ (x) = m,
norm , then (iii) would be applied. We can show:
Lemma 12. For a C-dominated term t, the set Σ(t) can be computed in exponential time in the size of t.
We are now ready to define the reduction function which turns T into T + . The Horn theory T + is given in Fig. 2 . With the results shown above, it is clear that T + can be constructed in exponential time from T . The Horn clauses in (6)- (9) simulate the ⊕-rule in case the terms we consider are C-dominated. The other rules in T are simulated by the rules in (5), which are constructed in such a way that they allow us to produce messages in normal form for input messages in normal form.
We can now state the main theorem of this paper. This theorem states that a message (a secret) can be derived from T using derivations modulo XOR if and only if it can be derived from T + using only syntactic derivations, i.e., no algebraic properties of XOR are taken into account. As mentioned, this allows to reduce the problem of verifying secrecy for cryptographic protocols with XOR, to the XORfree case. The latter problem can then be handled by tools, such as ProVerif, which otherwise could not deal with XOR. Before we prove this theorem, we illustrate the reduction by our running example.
Example
Consider the Horn theory TP NSL ⊕ of our running example. As mentioned in Section 3, this Horn theory is C-dominated for C = {a, b}. In what follows, we illustrate how T + P NSL ⊕ looks like, where the elements of C are ordered as a < C b.
First, consider the instances of Horn clauses of TP NSL ⊕ given by (5) . Only the Horn clauses in (3) have fragile subterms. All other Horn clauses have only one instance in T + P NSL ⊕ : the rule itself. This is because for such Horn clauses Σ(·) contains only one substitution, the identity. The Horn clause in (3) has one fragile subterm, namely x. Hence, the domain of every substitution in the corresponding Σ-set is {x}, and according to Definition 4, this set contains the following eight substitutions: item (i) gives σ1 = {x/x}; item (ii) gives σ2 = {a ⊕ x/x}, σ3 = {b ⊕ x/x}, and σ4 = {(a ⊕ b) ⊕ x/x}; item (iii) gives σ5 = {0/x}, σ6 = {a/x}, σ7 = {b/x}, and σ8 = {a ⊕ b/x}. For each of these substitutions we obtain an instance of (3). For example, σ4 yields 
Proof of Theorem 1
In what follows, let T be a C-dominated Horn theory and b be a C-dominated message in normal form. Note that b = b. The following lemma proves that our reduction is sound, i.e., that T + b implies T ⊕ b.
Lemma 13. If π is a syntactic derivation for b from T + , then π is a derivation for b from T modulo XOR.
Proof. Let π be a syntactic derivation for b from T + . To prove the lemma it suffices to prove that each π(i) can be obtained by a derivation modulo XOR from T and π<i. If π(i) is obtained from π(j) and π(k) for j, k < i, using one of the Horn clauses (6)- (9), then we can apply the ⊕-rule with π(j) and π(k) to obtain π(j) ⊕ π(i) ∼ π(i). Now, suppose that π(i) is obtained using a Horn clause in (5) of the form r1σ , . . . , rnσ → r0σ for some Horn clause (r1, . . . , rn → r0) ∈ T and some σ ∈ Σ( r0, . . . , rn ). Hence, there exists a substitution θ and, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists j < i such that π(j) = r k σ θ ∼ (r k σ)θ = r k (σθ). So, we can use the rule r1, . . . , rn → r0 to obtain r0(σθ) = (r0σ)θ ∼ r0σ θ = π(i). Note that t ∼ t and if t ∼ t , then tσ ∼ t σ for all terms t, t and substitutions σ.
To prove the completeness of our reduction, i.e., that T ⊕ b implies T + b, we first prove the property of Σ(t) mentioned before Definition 4. For this, we need the following definition.
Definition 5. Let t be a C-dominated term and θ be a C-dominated, ground substitution in normal form with r1σ , . . . , rnσ → r0σ for each C-dominated rule r 1 , . . . , rn → r 0 of T and each σ ∈ Σ( r 0 , . . . , rn ). dom(θ) = var(t). Let σ = σ(t, θ) be the substitution defined as follows. The domain of σ is the set of all variables that occur in some s ∈ F(t). Let x be such a variable. We define σ(x) according to the following conditions, which have decreasing priority: (a) If there exists s ∈ F(t) with x ∈ var(s) such that sθ ∈ C ⊕ , then σ(x) = θ(x). (b) Otherwise, if x ∈ F(t) and θ(x) = c ⊕ s , for c ∈ C ⊕ and some standard term s not in C ⊕ , then σ(x) = c ⊕ x. (Note that c = 0 since θ(x) is in normal form.) (c) Otherwise, σ(x) = x. (Note that in this case we know that θ(x) is some standard term not in
Equipped with this definition, we can show the property of Σ(t) mentioned before Definition 4.
Lemma 14. Let t be a C-dominated term and θ be a C-dominated, ground substitution in normal form with dom(θ) = var(t). Then, σ = σ(t, θ) ∈ Σ(t) and there exists a substitution θ such that θ = σθ , i.e., θ(x) = σ(x)θ for every x ∈ dom(θ), and t θ = t σ θ for every subterm t of t.
We can now show the completeness of our reduction.
Lemma 15. If π is a C-dominated derivation for b from T modulo XOR, then π is a syntactic derivation for b from T + .
Proof. We show that every π(i) can be derived syntactically from T + and π<i . Two cases are distinguished:
is obtained from π(j) = I(t) and π(k) = I(s), for j, k < i, using the ⊕-rule. In that case π(i) ∼ I(t⊕s). By assumption t, s, and t ⊕ s are C-dominated, and hence, t , s , t ⊕ s are either normalized standard terms not in C ⊕ , terms in C ⊕ norm , or terms of the form c ⊕ u for c ∈ C ⊕ norm and a normalized standard term u / ∈ C ⊕ , respectively. However, it is not the case that t = c⊕u or t = u and s = u / ∈ C ⊕ or s = c ⊕ u with u = u since otherwise t ⊕ s would not be C-dominated. Now, it is easy to see that ⊕-rule can be simulated by one of the Horn clauses (6)-(9).
Case 2: π(i) is obtained using some C-dominated rule (r1, . . . , rn → r0) ∈ T and a ground substitution θ. Since π is C-dominated, by Lemma 6 and 3 we may assume that θ is C-dominated. Since π is a derivation modulo XOR, we may also assume that θ is in normal form. We have that π(i) ∼ r0θ and there exist j1, . . . , jn < i such that π(j k ) ∼ r k θ, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let σ = σ( r0, . . . , rn , θ) and let θ be as specified in Lemma 14. By Lemma 14, σ ∈ Σ( r0, . . . , rn ). Now, to obtain π(i) , we can use the rule ρ = ( r1σ , . . . , rnσ → r0σ ) ∈ T + with the substitution θ . In fact, by Lemma 14,  we have that r k σ θ = r k θ = π(j k ) for all k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, where j0 = 0. (Recall that for C-dominated terms s and t with s ∼ t, we have that s = t .)
Now, from the above lemma and Proposition 1 it immediately follows that T ⊕ b implies T + b.
AUTHENTICATION
In the previous section, we showed how to reduce the derivation problem modulo XOR for C-dominated Horn theories to the syntactic derivation problem. While the derivation problem corresponds to the secrecy problem for cryptographic protocols w.r.t. an unbounded number of sessions, in this section, we will see that it is not hard to extend our result to authentication properties.
Authentication as correspondence assertions. Authentication properties are often expressed as correspondence assertions of the form end(x) → begin(x) where x describes the parameters on which the begin and end events should agree. This correspondence should be read as follows: If event end(x) has occurred, then also event begin(x). For example, end(a, b, n) → begin(a, b, n) could be interpreted as: If b thinks to have finished a run of a protocol with a in which the nonce n was used (in this case event end(a, b, n) occurred), then a has actually run a protocol with b in which n was used (in this case event begin(a, b, n) occurred). To check such correspondence assertions in the Horn theory based approach, roughly speaking, the protocol rules are augmented with atoms representing events of the form begin(x) and end(x) (see, e.g., [3] for details). Now, let T be a Horn theory model of a protocol and an intruder. Following Blanchet [3] , we say that a (noninjective) correspondence assertion of the form end(x) → begin(x) is satisfied by T if for every finite set of messages B and every mes-
where b B = {t | there exists t ∈ B and t ∼ t }. In [3] , this formulation (more precisely, a syntactic version, i.e., the XOR-free version) is somewhat implicit in a theorem which reduces correspondence assertions in process calculus to Horn theories. Blanchet then proposes a method for proving the syntactic version of (10) using ProVerif.
Extending our reduction to correspondence assertions. The following theorem extends our reduction presented in Section 4 to the problem of solving (10) with XOR. In fact, we show that if in (10) the (C-dominated) Horn theory T is replaced by T + (i.e., we can use the same reduction function as in Section 4), then derivation modulo XOR ( ⊕ ) can be replaced by syntactic derivation ( ). Now, the latter problem (the syntactic version of (10)) can be solved using ProVerif. Formally, we can prove: Theorem 2. Let T be a C-dominated Horn theory. Then, (10) holds iff for every finite set of messages B and every message m0 / ∈ B, it holds that T + ∪ {begin(m) | m ∈ B} end(m0).
The proof of this theorem requires some slight extension of Proposition 1 in which an injective version of ∆ is used, i.e., t = t should imply that ∆(t) = ∆(t ). This is needed to guarantee that if m0 / ∈ B, then ∆(m0) / ∈ ∆(B).
EXPERIMENTS
We have implemented our reduction, and together with ProVerif, tested it on a set of protocols which employ the XOR operator. In this section, we report on our implementation and the experimental results.
Implementation
We have implemented our reduction function in SWI Prolog (version 5.6.14). Our implementation essentially takes a Horn theory as input. More precisely, the input consists of (1) a declaration of all the functor symbols used in the protocol and by the intruder, (2) the initial intruder facts as well as the protocol and intruder rules, except for the ⊕-rule, which is assumed implicitly, (3) a statement which defines a secrecy or authentication goal. Moreover, options that are handed over to ProVerif may be added.
Our implementation then first checks whether the given Horn theory, say T , (part (2) of the input) is ⊕-linear. If it is not, an error message is returned. If it is, a set C (of minimal size) is computed such that the Horn theory is C-dominated. Recall that such a set always exists if the Horn theory is ⊕-linear. It is important to keep C as small as possible, in order for the reduction to be more efficient. Once C is computed, the reduction function as described in Section 4 (with some optimizations tailored towards ProVerif) is applied to T , i.e., T + is computed. Now, T + together with the rest of the original input is passed on to ProVerif. This tool then does the rest of the work, i.e., it checks the goals for T + . This is possible since, due the reduction, the XOR operator in T + can now be considered to be an operator without any algebraic properties.
Experiments
We applied our method to a set of (⊕-linear) protocols. The results, obtained by running our implementation on a 2,4 Ghz Intel CoreTM 2 Duo E6700 processor with 2GB RAM, are depicted in Figure 3 , where we list both the time of the reduction and the time ProVerif needed for the analysis of the output of the reduction. We note that except for certain versions of the CCA protocol, the other protocols listed in Figure 3 are out of the scope of the implementation in [14] , the only other implementation that we know of for cryptographic protocol analysis w.r.t. an unbounded number of sessions that takes XOR into account. As mentioned in the introduction, the method in [14] is especially tailored to the CCA protocol. It can only deal with symmetric encryption and the XOR operator, but, for example, cannot deal with protocols that use public-key encryption or pairing. Let us discuss the protocols and settings that we analyzed in more detail. By NSL⊕ we denote our running example. Since there is an attack on this protocol, we also propose a fix NSL⊕-fix in which the message {| M, N ⊕ B | } pub(sk A ) is replaced by {| M, h( N, M ) ⊕ B | } pub(sk A ) for a hash function h(·). We analyze both authentication and secrecy properties for these (⊕-linear) protocols.
The (⊕-linear) protocol SK3 [18] is a key distribution protocol for smart cards, which uses the XOR operator. RA denotes an (⊕-linear) group protocol for key distribution [6] . Since there is a known attack on this protocol, we proposed a fix: a message kA,B ⊕h( key(A), N ) sent by the key distribution server to A is replaced by kA,B ⊕ h( key (A), N, B ) .
CCA stands for Common Cryptographic Architecture (CCA) API [1] as implemented on the hardware security module IBM 4758 (an IBM cryptographic coprocessor). The CCA API is used in ATMs and mainframe computers of many banks to carry out PIN verification requests. It accepts a set of commands, which can be seen as receive-sendactions, and hence, as cryptographic protocols. The only key stored in the security module is the master key km. All other keys are kept outside of the module in the form {k}km⊕type , where type ∈ {data, imp, exp, pin} denotes the type of the key, modeled as a constant. The commands of the CCA API include the following: Commands for encrypting/decrypting data using data keys. Commands to export/import a key to/from another security module. This is done by encrypting/decrypting the key by a key-encryption-key. The problem is to make the same key-encryption-key available in different security modules. This is done by commands that are based on some kind of secret sharing scheme and allow individuals to import their share of the key-encryption-key into a security module (key-part-import).
These commands can conveniently be modeled as Horn clauses. However, some of the Horn clauses which model the commands in the key-part-import process are not ⊕-linear. Fortunately, one can apply a standard unfolding technique for Horn clauses together with straightforward simplifications in order to obtain an equivalent Horn theory with only ⊕-linear Horn clauses.
There are several known attacks on the CCA API, which concern the key-part-import process. One attack is by Bond [5] . As a result of this attack the intruder is able to obtain PINs for each account number by performing data encryption on the security module. A stronger attack was found by IBM and is presented in [8] where the intruder can obtain a PIN derivation key, and hence, can obtain PINs even without interacting with the security module. However, the IBM attack depends on key conjuring [14] , and hence, is harder to carry out. Using our implementation (together with ProVerif) and the configuration denoted by CCA-0 in Figure 3 , we found a new attack which achieves the same as the IBM attack, but is more efficient as it does not depend on key conjuring. In response to the attacks reported in [5] , IBM proposed two recommendations. Recommendation 1. As mentioned, the attacks exploit problems in the key-part-import process. To prevent these problems, one IBM recommendation is to replace this part by a public-key setting. However, as shown in [14] , further access control mechanisms are needed, which essentially restrict the kind of commands certain roles may perform. Two cases, which correspond to two different roles, are considered, and are denoted CCA-1A and CCA-1B in Figure 3 . We note that the Horn theories that correspond to these cases are ⊕-linear, and hence, our tool can be applied directly, no changes are necessary; not even the transformations mentioned above. Since public-key encryption (and pairing) cannot be directly handled by the tool presented by Cortier et al. [14] , Cortier et al. had to modify the protocol in an ad hoc way, which is not guaranteed to yield an equivalent protocol. This is also why the runtimes of the tools cannot be compared directly.
Recommendation 2.
Here additional access control mechanisms are assumed which ensure that no single role is able to mount an attack. We analyzed exactly the same subsets of commands as the ones in [14] . These cases are denoted CCA-2B, -2C, and -2E in Figure 3 , following the notation in [14] . The runtimes obtained in [14] are comparable to ours: 333s for CCA-2B, 58s for -2C, and 0.03s for -2E.
